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# East Asia Review

23 January 1979

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## EAST ASIA REVIEW (U)

23 January 1979

## CONTENTS

<u>South Korean Officials Reflect on the Recent National Assembly Elections</u>	[ ] . . . . .	1	25X1
South Korean officials have publicly insisted that the recent elections were a victory for the Pak government, but there seem to be different views within the government on the significance of the December contest.			[ ] 25X1
<u>Indonesia: The Suharto Government's Prospects</u>	[ ] .	4	25X1
The Suharto government appears to be in as strong a political position as it has enjoyed any time over the past five years.			[ ] 25X1
<u>Japanese Labor: Current Status and Prospects</u>	[ ]	6	25X1
The low growth of the Japanese economy over the last several years has dampened the efforts of the labor unions to increase their political influence and has forced the unions to change their policies in negotiating for wage increases during the annual spring wage offensives.			[ ]
<u>Japan: The Problem of Hidden Unemployment</u>	[ ] . .	13	25X1
Despite a seemingly low unemployment rate of 2.3 percent, the real effects of low economic growth on Japanese labor have been masked because of government and business commitment to uphold the traditional Japanese system of lifetime employment.			[ ] 25X1

SECRET

North Korea - South Korea: Indirect Trade Deal [ ] . 16

25X1

South Korea has apparently succeeded in  
arranging an indirect purchase of 10,000  
tons of North Korean coal--the first sub-  
stantial economic transaction involving the  
two countries in decades. [ ]

25X1

North Korea: Grain Outlook [ ] . . . . . 18

25X1

North Korea in 1978 probably surpassed the  
record 8.5-million-ton grain harvest claimed  
for 197 [ ]

25X1

25X1

[ ] . . . . . 20

North Korea: Chronology (December 1978 -  
January 1979) (U). . . . . 21

25X1

25X1A

South Korean Officials Reflect on the Recent National  
Assembly Elections

25X1

Since the National Assembly elections on 12 December, South Korean officials have publicly insisted that the results were a victory for the Pak government. Describing the voting as a reflection of the country's growing political maturity, the officials have emphasized that the ruling Democratic Republican Party (DRP) won more of the contested seats than the major opposition grouping, the New Democratic Party (NDP)--68 to 61--in an election that was widely seen as one of the fairest on record.

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there are differing views within the Korean Government on the significance of the December contest. have privately expressed concern over undercurrents of discontent revealed by the election.

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Those officials who maintain that the election was a plus for President Pak point in particular to:

- The relatively high--77 percent--voter turnout. They described the voter participation as a demonstration that the population was interested and confident in the political process, and rejected the militant dissidents' call for an election boycott.

- The government's "hands off" policy.

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23 January 1979

1  
SECRET

Other South Korean officials take a less sanguine view, noting that candidates explicitly identified with the government received less than one-third of the total popular vote--31.7 percent, compared to 32.8 percent for the NDP--in the December election, and that the NDP outpolled the DRP in the major cities of Seoul and Pusan by nearly two to one. Such results, they conclude, indicate a tangible level of discontent, particularly in Korea's urban areas. In the last assembly elections in 1973, when Pak was in the process of consolidating tighter political controls after the enactment of the Yushin Constitution, the DRP won 38.7 percent of the vote, compared to 32.6 for the NDP. The remainder, as today, was divided among the splinter opposition party and independents. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] Korea's high rate of inflation, the new value-added tax, and a variety of urban issues, had obviously alienated city voters. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] scattered reports from local districts indicate that a significant number of voters were not merely unhappy over secondary issues, but were voting against the continuation of the present political system and President Pak's administration.

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[REDACTED] a growing number of Koreans believe that Seoul's rapid economic progress has followed the Japanese pattern, that there have been many changes in Japan's political leadership without any interruption of economic growth, and that economic development would continue in South Korea even with Pak absent from the scene. Such views have long been expressed routinely by Pak's opponents, but it is unusual to hear them from government officials [REDACTED]

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There is a danger in overestimating the extent of popular resentment against the Pak government based on the December election. It is impossible, for example,

23 January 1979

SECRET

to translate the DRP's 31.7 percent of the vote into a similar vote for Pak in the event the constitution were revised to permit popular election of the president. In the National Assembly election it was clear to all voters that actual control of the Korean Government and its domestic, foreign, and security policies, was not at stake. As a result, personal and local issues evidently took on a greater prominence in determining the outcome in many districts. [REDACTED]

At the same time, the unwillingness of many Koreans--especially the more sophisticated and volatile urban voters--to endorse Pak's party points up a potentially unsettling paradox in Korean politics: these voters, who have benefited most from Korea's "economic miracle"--which has been presided over by Pak--seem least inclined to provide Pak's party with political support at the ballot box. [REDACTED]

President Pak clearly is aware of his problems with urban voters, and in recent years he has committed increasing resources to housing, education, health, and social welfare programs in an effort to shore up his support in the cities. Despite such efforts, Pak's political problem has persisted; moreover, the prospect of continued rapid economic development and urbanization in Korea raises the possibility of further increases in political and economic expectations--and additional dissatisfaction--in the future. [REDACTED]

23 January 1979

25X1A

Indonesia: The Suharto Government's Prospects (U)

Over the past year, the government has undercut its domestic critics by showing progress on most of the problems on which they have been belaboring. Public annoyance over military corruption presumably has been eased by Defense Minister Jusuf's curbs on the privileges and the high living of the generals and by his efforts to improve the lot of the common soldier. Outside the military, the recent trial and sentencing of top police generals for corruption gave further evidence of the government's seriousness. In addition, a few particularly inept or corrupt governors have been replaced by more reputable persons. [REDACTED]

To counter carping that Indonesia's economic development programs have resulted in a wider gap between the rich and the poor, Suharto has emphasized the human needs and income equalization goals of the third five-year plan that will begin in April. Although announcements in Indonesia are frequently not followed up by deeds, the government in this instance has already gone beyond rhetoric by energetically searching for projects that will generate employment. [REDACTED]

One of the biggest boosts to the Suharto administration last year was not of its making--a record rice crop resulting from exceptionally good weather. [REDACTED]

Despite the accomplishments the Suharto government can point to, the basic disaffection of large segments of the educated population and the Muslim faithful remain. They will have a number of grievances they can raise when they choose:

23 January 1979



SECRET

- Devaluation. Even though the devaluation of the rupiah last November made economic sense, it has fueled price increases that will continue to prompt consumer complaints.
- Development slowdown. Emphasis on labor-intensive projects and monetary constraints resulting from stagnating or declining oil revenues could force a slowdown in economic development.
- Corruption. The anticorruption campaign has thus far focused on diversion of government funds to private coffers and has been only peripherally concerned with the bribes, commissions, and payoffs that are the more immediate annoyances for the average citizen.
- Student unrest. The coming trials of students arrested a year ago for anti-Suharto demonstrations are bound to revive student agitation.
- Muslim denials. Islam is a growing influence in Indonesia, particularly among the youth and educated city dwellers, and Muslim political elements are increasingly unhappy over their virtual exclusion from government circles. Deep divisions among Muslim groups seem, however, to reduce the likelihood of a concerted challenge from this quarter. [REDACTED]

Despite unresolved issues that spawn popular disaffection, the prospects are for an orderly continuation of military-based government. Suharto's preeminence remains such that he appears able to manipulate both his military and his civilian subordinates. [REDACTED]

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23 January 1979

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Japanese Labor: Current Status and Prospects (U)

The rapid and extensive development of the postwar labor movement during the 1960s and early 1970s rested to a large extent on high economic growth. Lower economic growth over the last several years has dampened the efforts of the unions to increase their political influence and has forced unions to change their policies in negotiating for wage increases during the annual spring wage offensives--labor's nationwide bargaining campaign with public and private sector employers. (U)

The Setting

Japanese labor unions represent about 33 percent of the work force and wield considerable influence in two of the opposition parties--the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) and the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP)--in sharp contrast to the period before World War II when only 7 percent of labor was organized and unions played a minor role in politics. Although each union is organizationally and financially independent, about two-thirds of the unions are affiliated with Japan's four national labor confederations:

- Sohyo, the General Council of Trade Unions of Japan.
- Domei, the Japanese Confederation of Labor.
- Shinsanbetsu, the National Federation of Industrial Organizations.
- Churitsuroren, the Federation of Independent Unions.

Sohyo and Domei are by far the most powerful, together representing nearly 55 percent of all workers affiliated with organized labor. Churitsuroren is loosely organized

23 January 1979

SECRET

and generally cooperates with Sohyo, while Shinsanbetsu is composed of only four small unions and a regional federation.\* (U)

Although the national federations have no real collective bargaining power and do not directly involve themselves in labor-management relations, they are the primary vehicle in the Japanese union movement's annual nationwide campaign and bargaining front with management. Because the national federations are also concerned with maintaining the unions' international connections and their ties with Japan's political parties, both Sohyo and Domei play a pivotal role in handling labor's relations with the political world. (U)

### Relations with Political Parties

Sohyo and the JSP: Founded in 1950, Sohyo remains Japan's largest national labor organization; it represents 37 percent of all organized labor--some 4,557,000 members--most of which is in the public sector. Since its establishment, Sohyo has been directly tied to the Japan Socialist Party. Indeed, the federation is the JSP's organizational mainstay and contributes substantially to JSP coffers and election campaigns. Like the JSP, Sohyo's ideological orientation remains essentially Socialist with a Marxist inclination, although the federation's leadership has gradually moved to downplay its militant political image in line with the general trend toward more moderate policy views evident throughout the opposition camp in the last few years. (C)

Because of its close connections with the JSP, Sohyo has generally mirrored the party's ideological divisions. For the most part, the federation is divided into three principal groups: the mainstream that supports the JSP and traditionally provides the Sohyo leadership; a small, antimainstream faction, which is pro-Communist; and, a "unification faction," composed of private sector unions that are more concerned with bread and butter than

\*The Japan Council of International Metalworkers Federation, established in 1964, acts as a liaison committee rather than as a national federation. It has for the most part remained apolitical, but takes an active role in the spring wage offensives. (U)

23 January 1979

strictly political issues. Together with the JSP moderates, the mainstream of Sohyo, led by Chairman Makieda and Secretary General Tomizuka, has sought to restrain the growing influence of the JSP's ideological militants who want to move the party closer to orthodox Marxist ideology. (C)

Concern about the JSP's lackluster performance in the last parliamentary elections has led the JSP and Sohyo leadership to try to promote more flexible, pragmatic party policies as one means to broaden the party's appeal. Sohyo and the JSP, for example, have recently focused on improving workers' living standards, unemployment problems, and increased benefits under the national health insurance system. (C)

Sohyo initially seemed receptive to increasing cooperation with other moderate opposition parties, especially the Clean Government Party (CGP). Sohyo and JSP leaders know, however, that they must deal with the more militant and powerful elements in their organization before considering any cooperation with the centrists. During their 1978 convention, for instance, Sohyo delegates expressed their concern that the moderate opposition was moving toward closer cooperation with the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)--a drift with the potential to undermine Sohyo's long-term goal of a Socialist-dominated government centered around the JSP. In any case, Sohyo's leadership recognizes that it cannot achieve short-term tax and welfare goals without the cooperation of the centrist parties since Sohyo-JSP efforts alone to move desired legislation through the Diet have had little success. (C)

Domei and the DSP: Domei, Sohyo's main competitor in the union movement, has traditionally supported the Democratic Socialists.\* Domei, which represents 18 percent of organized labor, is composed almost exclusively of private sector unions. Under the leadership of President Amaike and Secretary General Maekawa, Domei is committed to a union movement centered around the DSP. It

\*The rivalry between Domei and Sohyo extends to the DSP and the JSP as well since the rightwing elements of the JSP bolted to form the DSP in 1960. (U)

23 January 1979

SECRET

has called for replacing the Liberal Democrats with a "middle of the road government" that would legislate worker participation in enterprise management and union participation in the government decisionmaking process. On issues in the past year, it has emerged as an outspoken advocate of an expansionary economic policy, urging the government to increase consumer demand through tax rebates, generous wage increases in the private sector, and the expansion of imports. (C)

Both Domei's and the DSP's fortunes clearly benefited from the 1976 lower house election when the party gained 10 seats. Domei claimed that it was instrumental in the party's success--it now has 29 Dietmen in the lower house. Domei succeeded in winning election for nine out of 11 union-sponsored candidates it fielded under the DSP banner. Domei also helped to change the DSP image as an aging party by running relatively young, political professionals. (C)

Like Sohyo, elements within Domei also realize the necessity of establishing relations with other centrist parties, the CGP in particular, to win their cooperation in the Diet. The Domei leadership, for example, invited the CGP chairman to address its convention for the first time last year. The action prompted criticism from the local union delegates that the CGP, as a religious-based party, did not subscribe to DSP principles, which in turn led Domei Chairman Amaike to reassure the rank and file that future cooperation with the CGP would be developed carefully. (C)

As the principal ally of the DSP, Domei is strongly opposed to any form of cooperation with Marxist-dominated labor unions. The failure of Sohyo's attempt to use an all-union "labor lobby," which Domei had guardedly approved, to move labor-backed bills through the Diet in 1977 further reinforced Domei's aversion to cooperation with Sohyo on wage negotiations and employment measures. (C)

#### Spring Wage Offensives: Looking to the Future

The annual spring wage offensive was initiated by Sohyo in 1955 as an attempt to organize separate unions into a united negotiating front. Since the spring season

23 January 1979

coincided both with the traditional period for wage negotiations and the Diet's annual budgetary session, Sohyo's plan attracted increasing support from other national labor federations and independent unions that had formerly conducted separate campaigns during the year. (U)

The spring wage offensive has since the 1950s succeeded in maintaining a common labor negotiating front and has become a fixture in labor-management relations. Union tactics revolve around two principal elements: orchestrating a series of labor actions--including work slowdowns and strikes--designed to build up pressure on management, and the selection of a union chosen for its bargaining leverage to act as the leading edge and pace-setter in the negotiations of wage settlements. (U)

Notwithstanding the drama and publicity surrounding these tactics, Japanese labor-management relations are marked by little strife. Indeed, the high growth of the Japanese economy during the 1960s and early 1970s enabled management to maintain cooperative ties with labor through generous yearly wage increases based on a nationwide standard negotiated with the unions. (U)

The low growth of the Japanese economy since 1973 has, however, brought important changes in both labor's goals and tactics. This was particularly evident during the 1978 spring wage offensive. Although annual wage hikes had been declining in the last four years, in 1978 unions for the first time failed to maintain the real income of the rank and file because the rate of wage increase--about 6 percent--fell short of the rise in the consumer price index.\* (C)

In dealing with labor last year, management confronted labor's demand for a 12-percent hike by insisting that profit records and increases in employee productivity would be the sole criteria for wage boosts. The financial difficulties of the steel industry, whose workers have traditionally set the pattern for wage settlements in the rest of private industry, reinforced the

\*The increase of 5.9 percent, 5.4 percent, and 6.2 percent for the private sector, public corporation workers, and civil servants, respectively, fell below the 1977 consumer price index increase of 6.8 percent. (C)

23 January 1979

SECRET

reluctance of management elsewhere to grant large increases. Several major steel firms offered a boost of only 4.2 percent. That settlement, the lowest in 19 years, was accepted by the rank and file in large part because of the threat of layoffs and loss of employment implicit in management's position. (C)

Management's hand was also strengthened by the government, which called for restraint on private sector wage increases to curb inflationary pressures and limit the budget deficit. In the public sector, the government traditionally bases its wage offers on settlements won by the private sector. The government also argued behind the scenes against the union view that higher wages would stimulate lagging consumer demand. (C)

The government's behavior in 1978 exemplifies several significant changes in the policies of labor-management bargaining. During last year's offensive, the government succeeded for the first time in breaking the unity between private and public workers in the public workers transportation strike. In the past, the government has pressured private employers to grant more liberal wage hikes as a price for having the nationwide rail strikes terminated, but last year the government demurred, instead allowing popular indignation over the rail disruptions to build pressure on the unions. (C)

Labor's failure to gain substantial wage increases in the last several years has resulted in growing rank-and-file union dissatisfaction with the current system of annual, nationally coordinated negotiations. As one consequence, several unions have called for a review of the concept, including a study of the possibility of two or three year contracts with cost-of-living escalator clauses and of separating public workers' negotiations from those of private industries. (C)

In 1979, the unions will again face the problem of another year of low economic growth. Given their performance last year, they clearly recognize that their new goals must be realistic. Over the longer term, union leaderships also face the problem of a gradual weakening in their bargaining position stemming from changes in Japan's employment system. As a case in point, the sluggish pace of the economy has prompted business to review

23 January 1979

its commitment to the system of lifetime employment. Up to a few years ago, workers in large corporations could expect job security, no matter what the firm's profit picture. Permanent layoffs, rather than temporary, have become more prevalent among smaller firms--a development that has made labor's rank and file associated with larger corporations increasingly apprehensive about the future.  
(C)

Unlike their private sector union counterparts, the public sector unions do not face the problem of job security, but they are also being forced to reassess their bargaining tactics. Due to strong public opposition last year, public sector unions will not be as quick to exercise their major weapon--a series of illegal strikes--as they have done in the past to gain wage increases and their long-sought goal of the right to strike. Since labor laws substitute compulsory arbitration for the right to strike, public sector unions argue that the government has proscribed their ultimate collective bargaining weapon by denying them the right to strike. The public mood concerning this divisive issue, however, now appears to be favoring the government and will hamper union efforts to gain the right to strike during this year's spring wage offensive.

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23 January 1979

12  
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SECRET

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Japan: The Problem of Hidden Unemployment (U)

Despite a seemingly low unemployment rate of 2.3 percent, the real effects of low economic growth on Japanese labor have been masked because of government and business commitment to uphold the traditional Japanese system of lifetime employment. Japan's number of unemployed has remained well above 1 million for nearly two years; if this level of unemployment continues, it may eventually bring about extensive changes in Japan's labor-management system. In any case, the unemployment issue has been a troublesome one for the government, which is again attempting to address the problem in preparing this year's budget.\* The new budget proposals call for a 20-percent increase in public works spending to stimulate the economy and a 14-percent boost for an employment stabilization fund designed to preserve business commitment to the concept of lifetime employment. (C)

The lifetime employment system applies only to permanent employees--white and blue collar--of a firm. Although exact figures of permanent employees are unavailable, they generally comprise 70 to 80 percent of a company's work force during periods of high economic growth. The system of lifetime employment is buttressed by a significant layer of nonpermanent labor--"temporary" workers, including housewives, retired men seeking second jobs, and students--who do not receive the benefits of the permanent work force.\*\* (U)

\*Japan Fiscal Year (JFY) 1979 runs from 1 April 1979 to 31 March 1980. (U)

\*\*Under the traditional employment system, permanent workers are expected to retire at about age 55. Although they receive a lump sum retirement bonus at the time, they do not become eligible for pensions until age 60 and many must find jobs to support themselves and their families. (U)

23 January 1979

Several elements of the lifetime employment system have a significant impact on business operations. Essentially a worker is virtually assured of job security from the first day of his employment to the time of his retirement; he can expect regular salary increases throughout the period of his employment with his wages determined by age, length of service, and number of dependents. The system obviously entails a high--and steadily growing--fixed cost for business, which can be borne more easily during periods of high economic growth. Because these labor costs are fixed, however, a decline in corporate profits does not allow business to adjust its labor-related outlays. Indeed, the drain from labor costs in such a situation becomes even more acute when the number of higher paid older workers increases in proportion to lower paid younger workers. (U)

The slump in the Japanese economy over the last several years has put a strain on business commitment to the system of lifetime employment. Most Japanese employers view layoffs as desperate, last-resort means of dealing with the problem of surplus workers and consequently adopt various measures to avoid discharging employees. Some of the larger firms, for example, have been producing and selling goods at a loss in order to keep their employees at work. Others have reduced the number of temporary employees, encouraged early retirements through increased retirement bonuses, and dispatched surplus workers to companies within the same industrial group that are operating at full production levels. In addition, employers have begun to revise the seniority wage system by limiting automatic pay increases in order to keep labor costs down. (C)

In an effort to aid business and keep workers off unemployment rolls, the Japanese Government has initiated employment stabilization programs to subsidize firms that have surplus employees. This approach, first introduced to assist industries affected by the oil crisis in 1973, has led to an expansion in unemployment benefits and subsidized programs to allow companies to place workers on "paid leave" status. A new program, introduced in 1977, further expanded such direct government aid by providing official subsidies in the amount of one-half to two-thirds of the basic salaries of workers employed by firms included in the following categories:

23 January 1979

SECRET

companies in "depressed" industries; firms planning to lay off from one-fifth to one-fourth of their work force depending on their size; and, those willing to place employees on "paid leave" status. The new program also assists businesses in hiring workers between 55 and 64--the age group with the highest rate of unemployment. (C)

Although the employment stabilization programs have not significantly curbed the unemployment rate, they have helped to avert the collapse of some small and medium sized firms.\* They have also symbolized the government's determination to deal with the unemployment problem and in so doing probably reinforced the inclination of the larger corporations to keep redundant workers on the payrolls without government subsidy. (C)

According to some calculations, Japan's unemployment rate would be as much as 6.5 percent without government and business commitment to the concept of lifetime employment. Notwithstanding the government's emphasis on reducing unemployment, however, Japan's changing economic patterns, including its loss of competitive advantage over other exporting countries in old-line industries and a slower growth in other sectors are certain to continue eroding Japan's costly employment system.

25X1

\*Based on the \$4.5 billion allotted for these programs during JFY 1978, the benefits would only cover an average of 40,000 workers and prevent the employment rate from rising another .032 percent, according to US calculations. (C)

23 January 1979

25X1A

North Korea - South Korea: Indirect Trade Deal (C)

South Korea has apparently succeeded in arranging an indirect purchase of 10,000 tons of North Korean coal--the first substantial economic transaction involving the two countries in decades. The political significance of the sale is clouded, however, by the murky circumstances surrounding the deal, and uncertainty over whether Pyongyang is aware that the intermediary [redacted] as arranged for South Korea to be the ultimate recipient of the coal. The coal, costing some \$367,000, reportedly will be transshipped to South Korea through Japan this month. [redacted]

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South Korea has attempted to develop economic exchanges with Pyongyang on numerous occasions since the early 1970s, in an effort to normalize bilateral relations on a step-by-step basis and perhaps encourage more moderate and pragmatic North Korean policies. Last June President Pak personally called for the North to open barter trade with the South. [redacted]

Pyongyang was notified in November [redacted] that a buyer for 10,000 tons of coal has been located. When a letter of credit was issued by a South Korean bank, however, Pyongyang flatly refused to go ahead with the deal, reiterating its view that "machinations" on the part of South Korean authorities had precluded the establishment of economic relations. It instructed the agent to find another buyer. The agent replied that a mistake had been made--that South Korea was not the purchaser--and a new letter of credit was issued [redacted]. This letter of credit has been accepted by North Korea. [redacted]

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23 January 1979

SECRET

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Thus, whether in fact Pyongyang's policy-makers are aware of the South Korean connection, they will be able to claim ignorance should the deal become public knowledge. In any event, the coal deal falls far short of establishing a successful barter trade, and at this point it serves as a convenient method for North Korea to earn much-needed hard currency. [REDACTED]


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An important deterrent to any North Korean decision to open--even indirect--trade relations with the South is the possibility that such a move might lead both China and the USSR to increase their current small-scale and indirect trade with Seoul. There is considerable potential for profitable trade between South Korea and Pyongyang's major allies. [REDACTED]

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23 January 1979



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North Korea: Grain Outlook (U)


North Korea in 1978 probably surpassed the record 8.5-million-ton grain harvest claim for 1977. Improved growing conditions, increased application of agrotechnology, and the high level of harvest activities

support this assessment.


Pyongyang has not, however, announced fulfillment of its 8.8-million-ton goal. The early outlook for the 1979 crop season is also favorable.

1978 Crop Season: Conditions and Progress

Overall, growing conditions in North Korea were more favorable in 1978 than they were the previous year. The drought, that had seriously lowered water levels, broke by mid-June and created no significant problem for spring planting. In late June and early July, a quasi-stationary frontal system with heavy thunderstorms--some producing more than 150 mm of rain per day--provided more than adequate rainfall for the crops while replenishing reservoir supplies.



suggest that a record harvest was attained at the end of a favorable growing season.



The North Korean News Agency employed descriptive words such as "richest-ever," "bumper," "abundant," and "considerably higher" in reporting in successes of the 1978 harvest.

23 January 1979

SECRET

Agrotechnological Contributions to Grain Productivity

Increased dryland irrigation, terracing, and reclamation of tidal marshes--all part of the "Mother Nature Remaking Task"--provide a potential for increased agricultural production.

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Outlook for 1979

The early outlook for the 1979 crop appears good. The high reservoir levels that now prevail suggest that North Korea has the capability to overcome a prolonged drought should one occur in 1979. The country's comprehensive and apparently well-developed irrigation system was effective in overcoming the 1977 drought when reservoir levels were much lower. The minor crop damage resulting from above normal rainfall in 1978 suggests that flood control and drainage facilities are generally capable of preventing major crop damage.

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23 January 1979

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SECRET

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North Korea: Chronology  
(December 1978 - January 1979) (U)

9-20 December At the eighth Asian games in Bangkok, South Korea and North Korea place third and fourth respectively in the overall rankings.

16 December Pyongyang radio reports the government has "recently" issued guidelines on the five-year-old local budget system. Under this system, local authorities are expected to finance the development of the consumer-oriented light industry sector of the economy through revenues on the profits of local industries and service trades.

25X1

23 December In a lukewarm endorsement, Pyongyang characterizes the normalization of relations between the United States and China as a "normal event" in keeping with the general trend toward a relaxation of international tension. Noting the US declaration that it will not pursue "hegemony," North Korea calls on the United States to apply this practice also to Korea by withdrawing its forces and ending its support for the Seoul government.

23 January 1979

29 December - Vice President Pak Song-chol attends  
4 January Algerian President Boumediene's funeral in Algiers and makes a five-day visit to Libya. In stopovers at Moscow on his way to and from the Middle East Pak receives minimal protocol treatment.

31 December According to a Moscow radio broadcast on 5 January 1979, North Korea and the USSR sign an agreement in Moscow calling for a "remarkable increase" in the transport of cargo between the two countries through the port of Najin in northeast North Korea.

1 January Kim Il-song, in his annual New Year address, claims an overall growth rate for industry of 17 percent in 1978. This exceeds the annual rate for the current seven-year plan (1978-84), which is pegged at 12.2 percent.

3 January Kim Hwan, a member of the party's elite political committee, attends the opening ceremony for a North Korean - donated youth training center in Madagascar.

8 January About 50 North Korean personnel assigned to Phnom Penh, along with Chinese and other foreign representatives, exit Cambodia at the Thai border.

10 January South Korea announces that it has been assured by the International Table Tennis Federation in London of an opportunity to participate in the world ping-pong games to be held in Pyongyang in late April. The 20-person South Korean delegation intends to join other participants at Geneva and fly to Pyongyang via Moscow.

23 January 1979

SECRET

11-12 January

At the annual winter conference on agriculture, Kim Il-song congratulates farmers for harvesting another bumper crop but omits any figure on the harvest. Another speaker indicates that the grain target for 1979 will be 8.8 million tons, the same as last year's goal.

12 January

Five days after the fall of Phnom Penh North Korea, in an editorial article in the party daily, brands Vietnam's "massive military action" against Kampuchea as a "crude violation" of international law. Saying that Vietnam is following a "dominationist" course, Pyongyang calls for Vietnam to withdraw its armed forces so that the "Kampuchean people" can shape their own destiny.



25X1

23 January 1979

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